Binghamton University

The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship

Philosophy

2015

Consequentialism, Climate Harm and Individual Obligations
Christopher Morgan-Knapp
c.morgan-knapp@binghamton.edu

Charles Goodman
Binghamton University--SUNY

Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Morgan-Knapp, Christopher and Goodman, Charles, "Consequentialism, Climate Harm and Individual
Obligations" (2015). Philosophy Faculty Scholarship. 27.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/philosophy_fac/27

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at The Open Repository @ Binghamton
(The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.

CONSEQUENTIALISM, CLIMATE HARM AND INDIVIDUAL
OBLIGATIONS
Christopher Morgan-Knapp and Charles Goodman
Binghamton University

Steven Gardiner recently proposed a do-or-die test for moral theories. If a moral
theory does not acknowledge that failure to address a pressing, anthropogenic,
and tractable global threat is a serious criticism of it, he says, then that theory is
“inadequate and must be rejected.” (Gardiner 2011, 218)
We might wonder what moral theory could possibly fail such a test. It is, after all,
an awfully low hurdle. To pass the test, a theory doesn’t need to successfully
address the global threat: it merely needs to acknowledge that failing to
successfully address it is a problem. And how could a serious moral theory
simultaneously recognize that something is a significant moral problem, and then
imply that doing nothing about it is just fine?
According to some ethicists, though, this is just what act-consequentialism could
do in response to anthropogenic climate change. In particular, they think that
even if widespread, voluntary reductions in carbon emissions are both necessary
and sufficient to avoid a climate catastrophe, act-consequentialism will counsel
against making them. 1 Their first point is that, in consequentialist terms,
anthropogenic climate change should be avoided: the world we are in for if
nothing is done to avert (or at this late date, diminish) climate change is much
worse than worlds we could bring about by choosing to emit less carbon into the
atmosphere. Their second point is that act-consequentialism implies that the vast
majority of us should not reduce our emissions. And this will be so, they say, even
if such reductions are needed to avoid the awful consequences of climate change.
Here is how one such critic, Ronald Sandler, makes the case for this second point:
Almost any action performed by almost any agent will have a vanishingly
small effect on [climate change]. Many of these same actions will have
burdens for the agent and those close to her (i.e., family and friends), in
terms of, for example, time, economic costs, social costs, and professional
Gardiner himself says that “standard utilitarian thinking (such as cost-benefit
analysis) might well fail the … test.” (241) But his worries primarily concern the
use of act-consequentialism as a decision procedure and hence are different from
the more theoretical worries we will be discussing.
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costs. In such cases the local utility of actions that contribute to [climate
change] … will outweigh the inconsequential global utility of those actions.
Therefore, act utilitarianism cannot explain why we ought to act or live in
ways [needed to mitigate climate change] when doing so has costs or
sacrifices associated with it. (Sandler 2010, 170-1)
Sandler takes his argument to be reason for rejecting consequentialism, but other
theorists are willing to bite the bullet: they take the same reasoning to show that
we aren’t really morally obligated to emit less. After characterizing the problem of
climate change as a tragedy of the commons (which he abbreviates ‘T of C’),
Baylor Johnson asks whether taking unilateral, individual steps to lower emissions
is morally required. His answer:
The only reason to adopt unilateral restraint is to avert a T of C. So if
unilateral restraint cannot reasonably be expected to achieve its purpose,
there is no reason, and hence no moral reason to adopt it. …. I claim that
averting a T of C is the only reason for adopting unilateral restraint
because in a T of C there is nothing wrong with any one person’s use of
the commons. No one person’s use is large enough to harm the commons.
Harm results only from the aggregate level of use. (Johnson 2003, 277)
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, too, argues against an individual moral obligation to
reduce our emissions grounded in the claim that individual emissions make
climate change worse. “The problem with this argument,” he says, is
that my act of driving does not even make climate change worse. Climate
change would be just as bad if I did not drive. …. Global warming and
climate change occur on such a massive a scale that my individual driving
makes no difference to the welfare of anyone. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005,
301)

Similar reasoning can also underlie the idea that consequentialists should use
something other than actions as their primary evaluative focus. Take, for instance,
Dale Jamieson’s defense of the idea that when moral problems like climate change
are at issue consequentialists should focus on character traits rather than actions.
There he claims that “Joy-riding in my ’57 Chevy will not in itself change the
climate, nor will refraining from driving stabilize the climate…” and takes this to
be an instance of a general problem; namely that if we look only at the
consequences of actions in “large-scale collective action problems … it appears
that both morality and self-interest demand that ‘I get mine,’ since whatever
others do, it appears that both I and the world are better off if I fail to
cooperate.”(Jamieson 2007, 167)
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Act-consequentialists will be happy to hear that these authors are all mistaken: as
we show in what follows, embracing act-consequentialism should not lead to
complacency, much less a sense of righteousness, regarding our individual
emissions. Quite the contrary, it implies that most of us should be making
immediate and significant reductions in our contributions to the global stock of
greenhouse gases. Act-consequentialism does not fail Gardiner’s test.
But it is not only act-consequentialists who should be heartened. Johnson and
Sinnott-Armstrong both seem to find their own conclusions regarding the moral
status of frivolous emissions counter-intuitive, if not morally dubious. It seems they
embrace them only because that is where their arguments take them.
Understanding why spending one’s Saturday speeding up and down the river on
one’s powerboat is wrong because of its contribution to climate change should
thus help them bring their gut intuitions in line with their commitment to rational
analysis.
Deontologists, too, should welcome this result. As we will detail below, at the root
of these challenges to act-consequentialism is the idea that individual emissions are
harmless. If that were right, a deontological duty to reduce one’s emissions that
appeals to a constraint against harming, or against risking harm, could not even
get off the ground: a constraint against harming can’t prohibit doing something
harmless. But while deontological approaches may well face other difficulties in
this context, our analysis will show why this is not one of them.
And finally, the reasoning at the core of this challenge to act-consequentialism is
hardly esoteric. We suspect that many outside of academic philosophy think of
their own lifestyle choices in similar terms. That is, though they acknowledge that
their carbon footprint is heavier than it needs to be, many also conclude that this
does not matter. If they were to give up their powerboat, or their exotic vacations,
or their air conditioning, they think, this would not change anything regarding the
climate. All it would really do is diminish their own contentment. Even from a
moral perspective, then, it seems to them pointless. To the extent that such
thinking is common, understanding where it goes wrong is an important step
towards helping people make the choices that are necessary to avert a climate
catastrophe.
§1. Preliminaries
Our core thesis is that act-consequentialism implies that luxury greenhouse gas
emissions are typically wrong. Before mounting our defense, though, let us begin
with some clarifications.
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To say that some type of action is typically wrong is ambiguous. Following Parfit,
we can distinguish two senses of ‘wrong’ that are germane to the current
discussion. First, we might say that an action is ‘wrong in the fact-relative sense’
just when it would be morally impermissible to choose the action if we knew all
the relevant facts. By contrast, we might say an action is ‘wrong in the evidencerelative sense,’ just when it would be morally impermissible to choose the action if
what the available evidence gives us reason to believe were true.2
To see the difference, consider one of Parfit’s examples: You know that 100
miners are trapped underground, with floodwaters rising. You know that they are
all in one of two shafts, but have no reason to believe they are in one rather than
the other. You can choose to close one of three flood-gates, and you know that the
consequences of your choice would be as follows:
THE MINERS ARE IN

YOU CHOOSE

SHAFT A

SHAFT B

GATE 1

You save 100

You save 0

GATE 2

You save 0

You save 100

GATE 3

You save 90

You save 90

In the fact-relative sense, it would be wrong to close Gate 3. This is because if you
knew all the relevant information, you would know where the miners were, and
hence could save more lives by choosing to close either Gate 1 or Gate 2. But in
the evidence-relative sense of ‘wrong,’ it would be wrong to choose either Gate 1
or Gate 2. This is because given the available evidence, they could be in either
Shaft A or B, and so by closing one of them you have only a 50% chance of saving
100, whereas if you close Gate 3 you are sure to save 90. (Parfit 2011, 159)
We will have something to say about what act-consequentialism implies about the
wrongness of emissions in the fact-relative sense. But when we say that actconsequentialism implies that luxury emissions are typically wrong, we mean this
in the evidence-relative sense. This is because the evidence-relative sense is the
sense of wrongness that is relevant when we are trying to decide what to do. When
This distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction others have labeled with
the terms ‘subjective rightness’ and ‘objective rightness.’ As we will explain, it is
this distinction that lies behind the shift some utilitarians have made from actual
to expected utility as the target choices are aimed at, morally speaking.

2
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making decisions, we often do not – and indeed cannot – know all the relevant
facts. We are making decisions under uncertainty, and hence are really choosing
which risks to run rather than which outcome to bring about. This is especially
clear when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions, which may stay in the
atmosphere for centuries: we cannot have justified beliefs concerning precisely
what the particular molecules of CO2 we put into the atmosphere now will cause
200 years from now. So the pressing question prospectively is what we should and
shouldn’t decide given the evidence that is now available. And since the authors
with whom we disagree are all interested in understanding what we should now
decide to do about greenhouse gas emissions, they too are, or at least should be,
focused on what is wrong in the evidence-relevant sense.
The second point that needs clarifying is what we mean by ‘act-consequentialism.’
Common to all versions of act consequentialism is the idea that the wrongness of
an action is solely a function of the impersonal value of its outcome. But different
variations on this core idea can be more and less plausible analyses of different
senses of ‘wrong.’ One straightforward version of act-consequentialism holds that
actions are wrong if there is some available alternative action whose outcome
would be impersonally better. This version is a plausible consequentialist analysis
of wrongness in the fact-relative sense. But it is not a plausible consequentialist
analysis of wrongness in the evidence-relative sense. Consider again, the case of
the miners. This theory would imply that your choosing Gate 3 is wrong, because
even given only the available evidence, you can be sure that there is an available
alternative that has a better outcome. As we suggested above, though, choosing
Gate 3 does not seem wrong in the evidence-relative sense.
A far better act-consequentialist analysis of evidence-relative wrongness holds that
an action is wrong just in case there is an available action whose outcome has a
better expected value. The expected value of an action’s outcome is the sum, over
all possible outcomes, of the value of each possible outcome multiplied by the
chances of that outcome occurring.
A final comment is in order regarding ‘luxury’ emissions. Here we follow many in
making a distinction between increasing atmospheric carbon concentrations by,
say, heating one’s private swimming pool and by eating enough vegetables to stay
healthy. The former is a luxury emission, while the latter is what is often called a
‘subsistence’ emission. (Shue 1993) There are several ways of generalizing this
distinction. In what follows, we will use these terms to refer to the position any
particular emission occupies on a spectrum that ranges from the most beneficial to
the most frivolous emissions. On one side of the spectrum – the subsistence side –
are emissions that make a very significant contribution to people’s quality of life,
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while on the other side – the luxury side – are those whose contribution is
comparatively trivial.3
So to sum up, when we say that act-consequentialism implies that most luxury
emissions are wrong, we are saying that when most of us increase atmospheric
carbon in ways that do relatively little to improve our lives, there are alternative
choices we could make whose outcomes have a higher expected value, and
consequently that causing such emissions is morally wrong in the evidence-relative
sense.
§2. The Initial Analysis and Two Challenges
We start with an assumption that would be granted by all the authors we are
engaged with: things will not go as well as they could unless emissions are reduced.
Given this assumption, there is a straightforward reason for thinking that most
luxury emissions are wrong according to act-consequentialism. Since reducing the
aggregate level of emissions could improve on the status quo, and choosing to
forgo luxury emissions would reduce aggregate emissions without causing much
hardship, it seems things would be better if we choose not to emit luxuriously. And
if so, some luxury emissions must be wrong according to act-consequentialism.
(Exactly which luxury emissions will be wrong will be a function of how far above
the optimal level of emissions we currently are. Here is one way to visualize how
this would work: imagine ordering all emissions on our spectrum, from the most
beneficial to the least. Now, starting from the most beneficial emissions, add the
emissions in order until the optimal level of emissions is reached. Any emissions
that would lie beyond this point would be wrong, provided the straightforward
analysis holds.)
Avram Hiller makes a very similar point. The crucial issue, he recognizes, is how
much harm a luxury emission like a Sunday drive creates. And, he says, “there is a
fairly elementary way to determine the answer:
(Step 1) Estimate the amount of GHG emitted by the one drive, d.
(Step 2) Estimate the total amount of GHG emissions responsible
for climate change, e.
(Step 3) Estimate the total amount of harm that climate change will
cause, h.
Where any given emission falls will depend, of course, on the correct theory of
well-being. While resolving this will sometimes be important in practice, it won’t
be necessary for the more theoretical points being made here.

3
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(Step 4) Calculate (d/e) x h.”
Performing that calculation, he suggests, yields the result that a Sunday drive
produces harm that “is the moral equivalent of ruining someone's afternoon.”
(Hiller 2011, 357-8)
This straightforward analysis trades on the thought that the disvalue of global
emissions can be simply disaggregated: that the disvalue of each individual
emission is simply its share of the disvalue of total emissions. To this we can add
that, if we grant simple disaggregation, and we grant that it is better for aggregate
emissions to go down, then it must be better if those individual emissions that
produce relatively little good are eliminated. The aggregate value, we might think,
is just the sum of its parts, and so if the aggregate value is sub-optimal, then the
least beneficial of its parts must be sub-optimal as well.
Implicit or explicit scepticism about simple disaggregation, however, is what leads
many to the conclusion that individual decisions to avoid luxury emissions do not
make things any better. How could this be? Two lines of thought seem initially
plausible. The first is that many of our luxury emissions will occur whether we
choose to avoid them or not. A compelling example is airline travel. On the
simple disaggregation model, when one flies to Europe for vacation, one is
responsible for emitting the amount of carbon that the plane emits divided by the
number of passengers on the plane. But, as several have pointed out, attributing
this fraction of the plane’s emissions to your choice is suspect.4 If you had chosen
against taking the European vacation, they say, your flight would have gone
anyway and the same amount of carbon would have been emitted. So whether or
not you choose to be on the plane makes no difference to the amount of carbon
released into the atmosphere.
This reasoning can be generalized quite broadly. When we buy things, even
including fuel, it is typically true that if we had not bought them, somebody else
would. So the emissions that are connected to that product will occur whether we
are the purchaser or not. It is not as if the particular carbon atoms that are
released into the air when someone fires up their jet-ski would have stayed in the
ground otherwise; those atoms were already in the energy pipeline, and if the jetskier hadn’t burned that gas, someone else would have. Given this, it can be hard
to see what good forgoing a spin around the lake will do, at least as far as the
For instance, Joaquim Sandberg asks “How much of a [passenger plane’s]
pollution does an individual passenger cause?” and answers “…it would seem that
my behavior actually has no marginal effect here. Just as much carbon dioxide
will be emitted irrespective of whether I [am on the plane].” (Sandberg 2011, 232).
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climate is concerned – that carbon is going to find its way into the atmosphere no
matter what.
The second source of scepticism about simple disaggregation is more
philosophical. It starts from the idea that what makes luxury emissions bad in the
aggregate is their affects on welfare. The next step is to claim that welfare is
affected for the worse only if there is some discernible difference in the subject’s life:
if their experience is different, or their desires are less satisfied, or so on. But, it
seems, the climate is such a vast system, and each individual decision to emit
carbon so small, that individual emissions cannot make any discernible difference.
While trillions of luxury emissions might change the climate in ways that make a
noticeable and negative difference to the lives of many Bangladeshis, for instance,
no Bangladeshi will ever feel any different if you choose to lower your thermostat
by a degree on a particular day.
Unless we can dissolve these two challenges, act-consequentialism is in trouble visà-vis Gardiner’s test. If, for either reason, no good comes from most individual
decisions to forgo luxury emissions, then act-consequentialism will not give us
grounds to object to them. But in the aggregate, such emissions are very bad. So
act-consequentialism would tell us not to do what is necessary in order to avoid
what is a morally terrible outcome, even in consequentialism’s own terms. The
task for us then, is to show what is wrong with both of these challenges.
§3. Market Thresholds
In a discussion of the relationship between utilitarianism and vegetarianism, Peter
Singer showed how act-consequentialists have the theoretical resources to justify
moral criticism of behaviors such as airline travel.5 The problem for Singer was
why utilitarians should not buy meat, given that a single decision not to buy meat
seemed to make no difference to the number of animals raised and killed for food,
but his solution is directly applicable here. We can start by imagining that you
would like to go to Europe on vacation, and that the flight you would take
typically carries 100 people. True, if you choose to take the flight, it is unlikely
that this will make any difference to how much jet fuel is burned. But if 100
additional people want to fly to Europe on the same airline, the airline will add an
additional flight to meet the demand. Of those 100 people, there must be one
whose decision made the difference, crossing the airline’s threshold for adding
another flight.

Singer 1980, pp. 335-336. The strategy is also invoked in Matheny 2002 and
Kagan 2011.
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Might you be that person? You have, let us suppose, no evidence that would
license you to conclude that you are any more or any less likely than anyone else
to be the passenger who causes another flight to be added. So it would be most
reasonable for you to assign a subjective probability of 1% to this outcome. But if
you are the threshold passenger, then the marginal impact of your decision is that
one more flight is added. In this case, your individual choice adds an amount of
carbon to the atmosphere sufficient to transport 100 people to Europe. So the
expected amount of carbon to be emitted as a result of your decision is 1% of the
carbon normally used to transport 100 people: in other words, exactly the average
amount of carbon normally emitted per passenger.
How this analysis of market thresholds figures into an act-consequentialist account
of the morality of luxury emissions depends on whether we are interested in
wrongness in the fact-relative or evidence-relative senses. If we were concerned
with the fact-relative sense, our focus would be on the actual value of the
outcomes resulting from each person’s choice. For 99 of the people in our
example, their airline travel produces no emissions. But the trip taken by the one
person that pushed the airline over the threshold produced, individually, the
amount of emissions that an entire flight to Europe produces. Far from being
innocuous, then, this particular person’s choice made a significant difference to
the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. Provided the other challenges can be
met, that person’s choice of vacations is thus likely to be wrong in the fact-relative
sense.
How our travel decisions will impact airline schedules is a matter of considerable
uncertainty, however, and in such circumstances, what we are really interested in
is what is wrong in the evidence-relative sense. Here it is not the actual value of
our choices, but their expected value that is relevant. In this context, the effect of
Singer’s reasoning is to bypass completely the effect of skepticism about simple
disaggregation. Instead of naively disaggregating by merely assigning an average
share to each passenger, we compute the probability of being the threshold
passenger, and then put all the negative consequences caused by crossing the
threshold onto that outcome. Mathematically, however, the result will turn out to
be precisely the same. Each passenger should deliberate as if he or she was
causing a proportionate share of the damage; and if the value produced by the
choice is less than that share, the passenger should not take the flight.
Since this reasoning can be extended to all cases in which a person’s luxury
emissions seem to make no difference to the amount of carbon that is released into
atmosphere, the first challenge to the initial act-consequentialist analysis of luxury
emissions can be met.
§4. Meteorological Thresholds
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Despite its success with the example of the European vacation, though, it may well
seem that Singer’s threshold analysis can’t help us with luxury emissions like
recreational weekend driving. A small probability of causing harm can give us a
reason not to act. But if, as many claim, your driving on the weekend has no
probability at all of causing harm, then an argument based on expected value will
have no purchase on it. And it seems intuitively plausible that, given the vast
scope of the global climate crisis, your individual contribution will make no
difference. But is this plausible claim really true?
The reasoning for the behind the idea that my contribution makes no difference
can be broken down into two steps. First is the idea that the effect of individual
emissions on the weather is miniscule: the planet’s meteorological system is so
large, and the size of individual emissions so tiny, that whatever impact an
individual emission has on the weather must be vanishingly small. The second is
that vanishingly small impacts aren’t morally relevant because no one could
possibly tell the difference between such an impact occurring and it not occurring.
Perhaps your emission could add one droplet of water from a flood or remove one
droplet of water from a drought. But if no one can tell the difference such tiny
impacts make, then there is nothing bad about them occurring. Events are only
harmful if they make a difference to someone’s experience, and if no one could
ever tell if a drought or a flood contained one more or less droplet of water, then
this kind of impact can’t be experienced and so isn’t harmful.
This kind of reasoning, however, is invalid. Indeed, both steps are incorrect. In
this section we will discuss the first, and in the subsequent section, the second.
Can the effects of individual luxury emissions be anything but miniscule? SinnottArmstrong believes not: “No storms or floods, or droughts or heat waves can be
traced to my individual act of driving,” says he. (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, 299)
Unfortunately, this empirical claim is false. Scientists have known for decades now
that the weather is a chaotic system, in the technical sense of exhibiting sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. As scientist Richard Kautz writes, “By 1964 …
numerical experiments with full-scale weather models confirmed the idea that
small perturbations grow exponentially in time.” (Kautz 2011, 161) In other words,
if we start with two descriptions of the state of the atmosphere that differ only in a
tiny way, and then allow each description to evolve in accordance with the
equations that we believe explain how the atmosphere changes, they will grow
more and more different with time. Indeed, according to Kautz, in our most upto-date weather models, the difference between the two descriptions will double
every few days. As a result, no matter how well we come to understand the
atmosphere, scientists believe that it will remain impossible in practice for us to
predict the weather beyond about two weeks in the future. (Kautz 2011, 161)
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This means that your decision to take a recreational drive may set off what is
sometimes called the “butterfly effect.” The effect is named after Edward Lorenz’
famous question: Could a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil lead to a tornado in
Texas? (Kautz 2011, 13) If we compare the Earth’s future in the scenario in which
you drive to the future in the scenario in which you don’t, the initial segments of
these two futures will be almost exactly similar. But the chaotic mathematics of
the equations that describe the atmosphere will cause these scenarios to grow
more and more different from each other with time. There is some very small but
non-zero probability that the scenario in which you do not drive features a
hurricane season next year that contains three hurricanes, whereas the scenario in
which you do drive features four hurricanes. An act-consequentialist interested in
wrongness in the evidence-relative sense must take into account the product of this
very small probability with the huge amount of damage that an additional
hurricane would cause.6
An opponent such as Johnson or Sinnott-Armstrong could object at this stage that
our argument threatens to lead to paralysis. Suppose that, having abandoned
your intention to take a recreational drive, you instead begin to deliberate about
whether to take a walk in the park or a stroll by the lake. There is some tiny
probability that, due to the butterfly effect, your walk in the park will lead to a
future in which there is one extra hurricane. Does this probability generate a
serious moral objection against absolutely anything you might choose to do?
Well, exactly the same consideration applies to a stroll by the lake: it too might
generate an extra hurricane. Equivalently, we could say that your walk in the
park might prevent one hurricane. And you have no information to suggest that
taking a walk in the park is any more likely to cause a hurricane than it is to
prevent one. So when you consider the vast probability distribution of all the
results that might come from your choice throughout the future of the earth’s
weather, you should be able to see that your subjective model of the distribution is
rationally required to be symmetrical with respect to this choice. All the possible
positive indirect effects and all the possible negative indirect effects of your
decision to walk in the park instead of the lake will cancel each other out, leaving
you with no climate-related reason to choose one or the other. As far as the ethics
of climate change are concerned, you free to walk in whichever place you would
enjoy most.

Hiller 2011 suggests that the possibility of the planet being pushed across
‘tipping points’ where feedback loops are started that lead to relatively sudden and
drastic changes should be handled the same way (361).
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Similarly, Kautz points out that the answer to Lorenz’ question is yes: the tiny
effects of a butterfly’s wings could interact with the unstable dynamics of the
weather to produce a tornado that would not otherwise have occurred at that time.
And yet, in another sense, butterflies don’t cause tornadoes:
Because the solar heating isn’t affected, the weather exhibits the same kinds of
events, from tornados to rainstorms, that we’re accustomed to. The effect of the
butterfly is simply to change the schedule of those events. (Kautz 2011, 162)
We could say the same about the walk in the park as opposed to the stroll by the
lake.
Matters are otherwise with the choice to take a recreational drive. The carbon
dioxide emitted by the car engine does affect the process by which the sun heats
the earth, and does change the level of energy in the atmosphere. Here the
distribution of effects is not symmetrical. It is slightly skewed towards worse
outcomes.
How should you assess the slight asymmetry in the climate future of the earth in
the scenario in which you take a recreational drive, as compared to the future in
the scenario in which you take a walk in the park? Suppose you reasonably
believe that you have some scientific understanding of what 3°C of global
warming would look like. Suppose that in that scenario, various harmful weather
events would take place that would not have occurred in a zero-warming scenario:
more hurricanes, more tornadoes, more floods, more droughts, and so on. Each
of these harmful weather events kicks in at a certain level of greenhouse gas
emissions. But you have no idea what that level is for any of the events. In fact, if
you were to break up all the greenhouse gas emissions between zero warming and
3°C of global warming into packets equivalent to the amount of greenhouse gases
your car would emit during a recreational drive, you would have no reason to
think that the packet from this particular recreational drive is either any more, or
any less, likely than any other to cause any one of these harmful weather events.
Given this setup, we can apply Singer’s threshold analysis in a more complicated
way, and get the same kind of striking conclusion we saw before. When you
multiply the harm caused by each of the weather events you are considering by
the probability that your recreational drive will cause the threshold for that event
to be crossed, and then sum all the products, you will end up with an amount of
expected harm that is precisely the overall harm of the increased incidence of
harmful weather events caused by 3°C of climate change multiplied by one
recreational drive’s share of the emissions that would cause that much climate
change. (For expository reasons, this analysis focuses on the number of significant
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adverse weather events that occur, and not on the precise degree of their intensity,
a topic to be considered in the next section.)
Of course, 3°C of climate change would also cause some beneficial effects. You
could take credit for your recreational drive’s tiny share of the probability that
each of these beneficial effects occurs. But we are assuming for the sake of
argument that the overall harm caused by 3°C of climate change greatly exceeds
the benefits. So you still have a consequentialist moral reason not to drive whose
strength corresponds to your recreational drive’s proportionate share of the net
harm caused by 3°C of climate change.
We have simplified the analysis by looking at a binary choice between no
warming and the specific 3°C scenario. To be fully rigorous, we would want to
take into consideration the probability distribution of the various amounts of
warming that could occur as a result of human activity. The resulting calculation
would be of ferocious complexity. To actually derive numbers would require all
kinds of information that we clearly can’t collect. But suppose we are allowed to
assume that large amounts of global warming would have many bad consequences,
and more intense global warming would be even more damaging than less intense
warming. We know that the actual calculation, which we can’t do, would assign
to the contemplated act of recreational driving its tiny proportionate share of a
wide range of outcomes, ranging from bad to cataclysmic, with only a few positive
outcomes to offset them. So even if we can’t know what the overall result would
be, we can have high confidence that the result of the expected harm calculation
would be bad enough to give you a moral reason not to take the weekend
recreational drive.
Let’s sharpen up that last claim. You would enjoy your weekend drive, let’s
suppose, a bit more than your walk in the park. But part of what we are assuming
is that if everyone were to engage unconstrainedly in activities that emit
greenhouse gases, the results would be so bad for future generations that the
history of the human race would go much worse than in a low-emissions scenario,
even taking into consideration the benefits that present people would derive from
enjoying their unconstrained polluting activities. You have no reason to believe
that you are special in this regard. So when we use threshold analysis to assign to
your weekend drive its proportionate share of the damage from climate change,
we are licensed to regard that proportionate share as morally outweighing the
enjoyment of driving that is your share of the benefits from polluting. Therefore,
if you are an act-consequentialist, you should conclude that it is morally wrong for
you to take the weekend drive.
§5. Perceptibility Thresholds
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So far we have argued that there is a small chance that individual emissions can
have significant effects on the weather. It might be that this, when combined with
Singer’s analysis of the moral relevance of thresholds, is enough to undermine the
argument that act-consequentialism can’t oppose weekend driving. But we can’t
be sure. This is because not all the bad consequences of climate change can be
attributed to increases in the number of extreme weather events. Some of the bad
consequences are much more graduated and hence the changes over time are
much more subtle: temperatures and sea levels gradually rise; water tables and
crop yields gradually fall; and so on. Moreover, some bad consequences will be
due to weather events being more intense than they would otherwise be. In order
to be confident in our inference from the badness of aggregate emissions to the
badness of individual luxury emissions, we must be sure that all the bad effects of
climate change can be disaggregated.
As noted above, there are some who think that this is not possible when it comes
to very gradual changes or changes in the intensity of harmful weather events.
The reason they are skeptical is that they believe that the difference any individual
emission makes with respect to such changes is so infinitesimal that no one’s life
will be any different whether the change associated with a single emission occurs
or not.7 And if no one’s life is made better or worse by an infinitesimally small
change, then a consequentialist cannot morally object to an emission that causes it.
Frank Arntzenius and David McCarthy, however, have shown in another context
that this line of reasoning, too, is invalid.8 Their paper deals with a fictional
example involving the administration of electrical shocks of varying intensity, but
we can translate their argument into the terms of the present debate. Start by
focusing on a single Bangladeshi who would suffer terribly from the accumulation
of many subtle effects of climate change caused by future emissions. There is a
very finely graded spectrum of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
This might be what Jamieson has in mind when he draws analogy between
individual emissions and the following case: “I, along with many other people, toss
an invisible smidgen of something into a blender. A man takes a drink of the
resulting mixture. Am I responsible for the graininess of the texture, the chalkiness
of the taste, the way it makes him feel after drinking it, his resulting desire for a
Budweiser? You might think that I am a smidgen responsible, since a smidgen is
the amount that I tossed into the blender. But I am tempted to say that I am not
responsible even for a smidgen of the result because there are so many thresholds,
non-linearities, and scalar differences that intervene between my action and the
outcomes.” Jamieson 2014, p. 164.
8 Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997, pp. 132-135. Norcross 1997, §IV and Kagan
2011 develop essentially the same point.
7

15

that starts from the concentrations there would be if emissions stopped right now
and ends with the concentrations sufficient to cause our Bangladeshi terrible
suffering. (For the present purposes, we’ll have the concentrations at adjacent
points on the spectrum differ by the amount of greenhouse gases emitted on a
recreational drive, but nothing hinges on this: we could have them even more
finely differentiated.) Now imagine that we could run the following experiment:
we allow the Bangladeshi to experience how things would be under the climate
conditions produced by each of those many, many possible atmospheric
concentrations while holding everything else constant. We give her a very long
series of experiences, where each one is of how she would feel under a randomly
chosen greenhouse gas concentration on our spectrum. And for each of these
experiences, we ask her to report as accurately as she can how things are for her.
We then tabulate the results: we list the greenhouse gas concentrations in order,
and for each concentration, we group together all the reports she gave when she
experienced the conditions produced by this level of atmospheric carbon.
What would this table look like? There are two possibilities to consider: either the
Bangladeshi’s reports are always the same whenever the greenhouse gas
concentrations are the same, or they are not. But we can be sure that at at least
one point on our table (and probably many), the reports for adjacent
concentrations are different. This is because they are different at the end points: if
the Bangladeshi would suffer terribly from the accumulation of many subtle effects
of climate change caused by future emissions, then she must feel much worse
under the concentrations at the end point than at the beginning point. That
difference must show up somewhere along the spectrum. Consequently, at at least
some point (and probably many points), the Bangladeshi really can feel the
difference that the emissions produced by a recreational drive makes. The claim
that no one will feel such differences would be false.
Of course, it is unlikely that our Bangladeshi’s powers of introspection are so finetuned and well-calibrated that the reports she gives at any given concentration are
always the same. Instead we should expect her to sometimes over- or under-report
what she feels – either because she is paying imperfect attention or because she
makes mistakes in how what she feels now compares to other feelings in the past.
But the frequencies of the reports between adjacent concentrations will at least
sometimes have to be different because they will have to be different at the end
points. Suppose, for instance, that the Bangladeshi chooses to give her reports
using a numerical scale where 0 is the number she usually assigns to the starting
concentration and 10 is the number she usually assigns to the terrible suffering she
experiences at the highest concentration. As our table progresses up the spectrum,
the mean of the reports will have to change from near 0 to near 10. And so for at
least some adjacent concentrations on the spectrum (and probably many, if not
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all), the mean – or the frequency with which she uses particular numbers to report
her experience – will have to be different.
Now to say that the emissions produced by a recreational drive can affect the
frequency with which a person perceives her suffering to be greater is not to say
that she will always feel the difference that any particular recreational drive makes.
But it is to say that at least some recreational-drive-sized emissions will change the
expected value of her felt quality of life for the worse. This difference should make
a difference to her, and it does make a difference to our moral assessment of the
consequences of the recreational drives. It should make a difference to her
because it gives her a self-interested reason to prefer that those recreational drives
that reduce the expected value of her felt quality of life not occur. This is because
she should conclude that the level of suffering she experiences from adjacent
concentrations whose mean report is different is in fact different: the facts about
the frequency of her reports give her reason to believe that things actually feel
worse at the higher of the two concentrations. It is just that the difference she feels
is so slight that she sometimes misses it or makes mistakes in comparing it to how
she remembers she felt at other concentrations.
The moral assessment of the consequences of recreational drives needs to take
into account the changes in the expected value of people’s lives they can make.
Consider first those recreational drives that make a change in the expected value
of the Bangladeshi’s life. When we are asking about wrongness in the evidencerelative sense, what we are interested in is the expected value of the outcomes of
our action. Since the value of the Bangladeshi’s felt experience is morally relevant,
changes in the expected value of her experience are relevant to the permissibility
of these drives. What should we say about those recreational drives, if any, that
don’t cause a change in the expected value of her experience? In a fact-relative
sense, their relationship to her is not a moral consideration, as they do not affect
her. But in an evidence-relative sense, things are different. Since we will never be
in a position to know whether our recreational drive is or is not one of those that
makes a difference, the question at issue is what their expected value is. And since
the alternatives are that our recreational drive either makes no difference or
makes the expected value of her quality of life worse, they too have a negative
expected value vis-à-vis the Bangladeshi.
We should acknowledge that the impact our recreational drive can have on the
Bangladeshi, though morally significant, is still tiny. It is likely to be dwarfed by
the positive impact that a recreational drive has on the driver. Recall, however,
that we have been considering only one person who can be impacted by a
recreational drive. In reality, there are (or will be) billions, and the analysis above
applies to each one of them. Our luxury emissions lower the expected value of the
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experiences of people around the globe, and will continue to do so for centuries.
All those tiny effects thus add up to a significant moral cost in consequentialist
terms.
Here, though, a new worry might arise. Can all those billions of tiny negative
impacts really outweigh the comparatively substantial negative impact of not
going on a recreational drive? Do tiny impacts on many different people really
combine to exceed the moral significance of a far more noticeable impact on one
person? There are several things to say in response. The first is that, strictly
speaking, our position does not depend on the claim that luxury emissions’
contribution to gradual climate change outweighs the benefits for the emitter. As
we argued, luxury emissions can also cause large-scale weather events. Our claim
is that together the expected disvalue of these large-scale and small-scale impacts
is greater than the expected value of at least some luxury emissions to the emitters.
It is also important to note that this is not the same worry that motivated several
of the contrary analyses we began with. These authors claimed that actconsequentialism provides no ground to object to luxury emissions because they
produced no morally relevant harms, not that the harms they produced were very
many but very small. The current worry, then, is really a worry about whether
act-consequentialism gives the correct explanation of the wrongness of luxury
emissions, not about whether, on its own terms, it can provide any explanation at
all.
Finally, the thought that there is some kind of mistake in thinking that all morally
relevant value is commensurable is hardly new, nor unique to climate change. It
has been the subject of a great deal of analysis – both positive and negative. This is
hardly the place to engage in detail with this complicated question. But we should
note that the particular comparison at issue here is importantly different from the
kind of comparisons that are normally thought to raise problems. Normally,
philosophers have been concerned about whether small benefits to many people
could possibly outweigh a fundamentally important benefit to a single person: for
instance, some are skeptical that preventing literally any number people from
suffering from a minor headache could be more valuable than preventing a single
person from being tortured to death.9 Denying oneself the pleasures of luxury
emissions is a far cry from being tortured, however. It is not just that these harms
are of vastly different magnitudes. They differ in kind as well as in degree. Torture
and death strike at the very core of an agent; they undermine all that could
plausibly make someone an object of moral concern. Having to wear socks in
one’s house to be comfortable in the winter does not. To the extent that
9

Norcross 1997 includes an especially rich discussion.
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skepticism about commensurability is compelling, it is so when things of
fundamental importance are at stake. Since luxury emissions do not even
approach this level of importance, and since nearly everyone will grant that
preventing many small harms can be more worthwhile than preventing a single
greater harm of the same kind, doubts about the kind of commensurability
necessary for an act-consequentialist to object to individual luxury emissions
seems relatively unproblematic.
So, if the analysis we have presented is correct, all the harms of anthropogenic
climate change can indeed be disaggregated, and this provides actconsequentialists with all they need to show that we should eliminate those luxury
emissions that would be sufficient to bring us down to the level of emissions that is
impersonally best. Before concluding, however, we should acknowledge that some
may think that this does not go far enough. For it may be that there are what
intuitively seem like terribly self-indulgent – and hence morally objectionable –
emissions whose elimination would not be involved in getting down to the optimal
level in the least costly way. There could be someone, for instance, whose sense of
self-worth is tied to using their private jet. Given how central burning fossil fuels is
to them, it could well be that their emissions contribute enough to their lives so as
to offset the expected harm they cause, in which case an act-consequentialist may
have to acknowledge that the emissions themselves are not objectionable. But to
some, this sounds obnoxious: how could jet-setting emissions possibly be justified
when we know that they contribute to harms that will befall innocent
Bangladeshis who are struggling to survive?
At issue here is the question of whether it can be wrong (in the evidence–relative
sense) to impose a risk on others even when doing so maximizes expected value.
Act-consequentialists say no, while others will disagree. This is not a debate it
makes sense to join here, however, and not only for the usual ‘constraints of space’
reason. For the point of our arguments has not been to establish the superiority of
act-consequentialist analysis of climate ethics vis-à-vis its competitors. Instead, it
has been to show why one influential source of its supposed inferiority is an
illusion, and why even those who care only about the effects of their actions from
an impersonal perspective ought therefore to care about their personal emissions.
And both these points would still stand even if act-consequentialism doesn’t
provide an exhaustive account of what makes the difference between those choices
that are permissible and those that aren’t.
§6. Conclusion
The arguments we have developed in this article have often been complex,
abstract, and counterintuitive. Yet our main conclusions are neither complex, nor
abstract, nor counterintuitive. In pursuing our own perceived self-interest, the

19

rich are doing terrible harm to other people and to the natural systems on which
humanity’s future depends. We should act, and act now, to reduce the damage
we are doing. When and if we can, we should act collectively, through
governments, political parties and NGOs. In the meantime, each of us has an
individual obligation to do what we can to stop harming others, including by
refraining from, or perhaps by purchasing offsets against, our own individual
luxury carbon emissions. Once people understand the science of climate change,
they immediately and intuitively recognize that they have reason to comply with
these straightforward and demanding moral obligations. Yet many have been led
away from recognizing what the morality of climate change genuinely requires of
them by a set of influential, seemingly compelling, but ultimately fallacious
arguments. In climate ethics, it seems, a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing.
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